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STATEMENT OF AMICUS CURIAE 
 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) contains Medicaid 
expansion provisions that will dramatically increase the fiscal burdens on States 
while drastically limiting their regulatory autonomy in respect of the provision of 
healthcare.  These burdens will fall disproportionately on Texas, where General 
Revenue Medicaid spending is projected to increase under the ACA by 48.7 
percent in the first ten years, more than in any other State.  Jagadeesh Gokhale, The 
New Health Care Law’s Effect on State Medicaid Spending, Cato Institute, April 6, 
2011, at 6, available at http://www.cato.org/store/reports/new-health-care-laws-
effect-state-medicaid-spending-study-five-most-populous-states.  
 The mission of the Texas Public Policy Foundation is to defend liberty, 
personal responsibility, free enterprise, and limited government in Texas and in the 
nation as a whole.  Because these goals will be particularly undermined by the 
Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA, the Texas Public Policy Foundation 
has an interest in this Court‟s determination of the validity of those provisions 
under the United States Constitution.   
 The parties have consented to the filing of this brief.  No counsel to any 
party authored the brief in any part, nor were any monies received from any party, 
or any counsel to any party, or any other person, for the specific preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
  
 
ARGUMENT 
The district court‟s grant of summary judgment to the federal government on 
the Medicaid count of this case represents a potentially historic development in the 
jurisprudence of the Spending Clause.  By ruling, in effect, that the emperor of 
“coercion doctrine” has no clothes, Judge Vinson has confronted this Court with a 
difficult choice: to decide whether there is in fact some point at which “pressure 
turns into compulsion”, as the Supreme Court presupposed in South Dakota v. 
Dole, 482 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 
548, 590 (1937)) or whether conditional federal grants are in reality an “instrument 
for the total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to the individual 
states”, as the Supreme Court warned in U.S. v. Butler, 291 U.S. 1, 75 (1936).   
The Texas Public Policy Foundation respectfully asks this Court to consider 
the Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA in the light of the potential that 
conditional federal grants have for eroding the whole federal structure of our 
Constitution.  If Judge Vinson was correct to rule that the practice of conditioning 
federal grants to the States is not limited by any doctrine of coercion, then the 
federal spending power can be used in effect to commandeer State governments.  
But the Spending Clause cases fundamentally presuppose some limit that can keep 
“the financial inducement offered by Congress [from becoming] so coercive as to 
pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion,” Dole, 482 U.S. at 211 
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(quoting Steward Machine, 301 U.S. at 590), to affirm the ruling below on the 
Medicaid count would be to hold that Dole, and many Supreme Court cases before 
it, were wrongly decided.   
Dole requires an inquiry into whether the States‟ acceptance of a conditional 
federal grant is voluntary not just in theory, but also “in fact.”  483 U.S. at 211. 
This Court should reverse the summary judgment below on the Medicaid count 
because there is at least an issue of material fact as to whether compliance with the 
Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA is “not merely in theory but in fact” a 
voluntary prerogative of the States.  A trial on the factual merits of the Plaintiff-
Appellees / Cross-Appellants‟s Medicaid expansion claims will quickly reveal that 
“in fact” the States have no choice but to comply with those provisions, because 
the sums of money involved, compared with the conditions imposed, become such 
an overriding factor in the deliberations of State legislators as to blot out any other 
consideration. Promising ideas for innovative and sustainable healthcare policies 
have had to be put off, indefinitely. In State legislatures across the country, from 
one end of the political spectrum to the other, the people‟s elected representatives 
are resigned to the inevitability of accepting the new Medicaid “conditions.”  
Because compliance is “in fact” the only realistic option, the Medicaid expansion 
provisions of the ACA clearly “pass the point at which pressure turns into 
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compulsion”.  If so, they constitute a commandeering of State agencies by the 
federal government, and are flatly unconstitutional.      
I. Conditional Federal Grants Pose Grave Dangers to State Regulatory 
Autonomy and to the Federal Structure of the Constitution. 
 
The government does not dispute that commanding the States to implement 
and bear part of the expense of implementing a federal program such as Medicaid 
would fall outside any of its enumerated powers under the Constitution.  Yet the 
federal government can in fact at some point compel compliance by taxing 
residents of the several States, and returning the money to them only on condition 
that their State governments cede to the federal government “the governmental 
powers reserved to the individual states.”  It is not disputed that Congress may 
exercise its taxing and spending powers “for the general Welfare of the United 
States”; nor that this power goes beyond the other enumerated powers of the 
federal government.  But “the Constitution simply does not give Congress the 
authority to require the States to regulate.”  New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 178 
(1992).   
Because “in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by 
Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into 
compulsion,” Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 590, the Supreme Court 
has long recognized that conditional federal grants can be coercive.  S.D. v. Dole, 
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482 U.S. at 211. The Medicaid expansion provisions of the ACA are not merely 
coercive; they are perhaps the most exemplary exposition ever devised of the 
coercive potential of conditional federal grants.    
A. Conditional Federal Grants Can Be Coercive 
 
In U.S. v. Butler, the Supreme Court noted that “if, in lieu of compulsory 
regulation of subjects within the States‟ reserved jurisdiction, which is prohibited, 
the Congress could invoke the taxing and spending power as a means to 
accomplish the same end, clause 1 of § 8 of Article I would become the instrument 
for total subversion of the governmental powers reserved to the individual states.” 
297 U.S. at 74, n. 21.  The Supreme Court had long recognized that, through the 
device of conditional federal grants, “constitutional guarantees, so carefully 
safeguarded against direct assault, are open to destruction by the indirect but no 
less effective process of requiring a surrender which though, in form voluntary, in 
fact lacks none of the elements of compulsion.”  Id. at 72 (quoting Frost Tracking 
Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 271 U.S. 583, 593 (1926)).  
The dangers that conditional federal grants pose to state regulatory 
autonomy, and to the whole federal structure of our constitution, go beyond the 
potential for de facto commandeering of State governments where States 
governments feel they have little choice “in fact” but to comply.   
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There is also an obvious inequity in punishing non-compliant States by 
shifting federal tax revenue from them to compliant States.  The taxing power is 
the anvil against which the hammer of coercive federal funding strikes its most 
anti-democratic blow.  It allows a majority of the States‟ representatives in 
Congress to tax everyone, and then condition the return of those funds on 
compliance with that coalition‟s policy preferences on the full range of issues that 
the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution leaves to the prerogative of the States.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the “intuitive difference” between the 
“denial of a gift” and a “sanction.”  College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Educ. Expenses Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999).  In College Savings 
Bank, the Court observed that the difference between a gift denied and a sanction 
imposed could disappear if the gift to be denied was large enough.  But in the 
context of conditional federal funds, a compelling argument can be made that 
because the funds in question come from the residents of the several States to 
begin with, they should not be considered gifts.  The threat of losing vast sums of 
money to other States is categorically in the nature of a sanction.  And even 
assuming that the conditional grant may be considered a gift, the Court in College 
Savings Bank made clear that threatening to withhold it could still cross the point 
of coercion.     
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The residents of Texas may want nothing to do with the state policy 
preferences of California or New York.  Yet through the mechanism of conditional 
federal funding, to the extent that voluntariness gives way to compulsion “in fact,” 
the preferences of the residents of these other States are substituted for the 
preferences of the residents of Texas in the determination of Texas state policy.   
This scheme is not just anti-democratic in principle, weakening citizen 
choice and the citizens‟ ability to influence the institutions of self-government.  It 
also has great potential to reduce the practical accountability on which the 
institutions of self-government so vitally attend.  The residents of Texas can vote 
their own legislators and representatives in Congress out of office.  But they cannot 
vote the legislators and representatives of other States out of office. And yet, as the 
prominence of conditional federal funds in State budgets grows apace, the 
legislators and representative of other States will have increasing influence over 
Texas policies within areas that are quintessentially matters of State regulatory 
autonomy, and as to which the maintenance of State prerogative is vital to any 
pretense of State sovereignty.   
Conditional federal funds also tend to reduce social welfare.  This is not 
merely because national uniformity in areas that ought to be matters of State 
regulatory autonomy kills the “laboratories of democracy” interstate competition 
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that is vital to producing best policy solutions in matters of State concern. To the 
extent that a minority of States pursue policies that confer a competitive advantage 
in attracting residents and businesses from other States, the conditions attached to 
federal programs advanced by a majority of States in the interests of uniformity 
create a scheme in which the minority States must choose between losing the 
competitive advantage gained by their policies, on the one hand, and giving up 
enormous sums of money, as a proxy for the gains obtained through such 
competitive advantage, on the other.  See, e.g., Lynn Baker, Conditional Federal 
Spending and States’ Rights, 574 Annals 104, 109, American Academy of Political 
and Social Science (March 2001).  This will often be at best an unpleasant choice, 
and at worst Hobson‟s choice.  
B. The Medicaid Expansion Provisions Constitute an Exemplary 
Case of Coercion 
 
The three major federal entitlement programs, Medicaid, Medicare, and 
Social Security, are on an unsustainable path to insolvency.  Taken together, they 
are projected to absorb up all currently projected federal revenue by 2062, 
exceeding 20 percent of GDP with no end in sight. Cong. Budget Office, The 
Long-Term Budget Outlook, 4 (June 2010).   Not content to expand such programs 
further still, the federal government is now inducing States to forsake their efforts 
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at devising sustainable healthcare programs, and join the federal government in its 
reckless abandon.   
The federal grant in Medicaid constitutes 40 percent of all federal funds paid 
to States. U.S. Census Bureau, Federal Aid to States for Fiscal Year 2009, August 
2010.  It is the largest single conditional federal grant program of all time, paying 
out hundreds of billions to State governments yearly.  Id.  The scale of the program 
makes it nearly impossible to imagine that any State could reasonably forego such 
a large amount of its citizen‟s taxes paid to the federal government for any reason.   
The problems presented by any conditional federal grant program are 
particularly acute where the federal government makes more onerous the 
conditions attaching to an existing program in which the States are already heavily 
invested.  Even assuming that the Medicaid program itself is not categorically 
coercive (an assumption that seems far less valid given the failure of any 
meaningful limit on the conditional spending power in the years since Dole), surely 
changing the original conditions on which States relied to their detriment in 
establishing federally-compliant Medicaid programs presents a different calculus: 
The case for arms length contract principles upon which the State voluntariness 
requirement rests is far weaker when the conditions are made more onerous in mid-
stream. 
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In U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936), the Supreme Court examined the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, which imposed a federal tax on farmers who 
could then draw benefits if they complied with the Act‟s dictates, then thought to 
lie outside the federal commerce power.  “The regulation is not in fact voluntary.  
The farmer, of course, may refuse to comply, but the price of such refusal is the 
loss of benefits. […] This is coercion by economic pressure.  The asserted power 
of choice is illusory.”  279 U.S. at 71. 
If ever there was a federal conditional grant program as to which the States‟ 
power of choice is illusory, Medicaid is it, and the Medicaid expansion provisions 
of the ACA are its most coercive element.   
 
II. The Coercion Doctrine is the Only Way to Protect State Regulatory 
Autonomy and the Federal Structure of our Constitution from 
Excessive Uses of Conditional Federal Grants. 
 
Federal courts have articulated or alluded to a variety of limits to the 
spending power, in order to diminish the long-recognized danger that the spending 
power poses to State sovereignty and to the federal structure of our Constitution.  
A meaningful doctrine of coercion is the only limit that offers any realistic hope of 
keeping that power in check.  None of the other limits commonly cited have 
proven effective in protecting State sovereignty from the expansion of conditional 
federal grants.   
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A. None of the Four General Restrictions on the Spending Power 
Articulated in South Dakota v. Dole Offer Any Protection for 
State Regulatory Autonomy. 
 
In attempting to trace the limits on the federal conditional spending power, 
the Supreme Court in Dole observed, “The spending power is of course not 
limited, but is instead subject to several general restrictions articulated in our 
cases.” 483 U.S. at 207, (citations omitted).  The Court listed four: (1) the exercise 
of the spending power must be in pursuit of “the general welfare”; (2) the 
conditions must be unambiguously stated; (3) the conditions must be related to the 
federal interest in particular national projects or programs; and (4) the conditions 
cannot require the States to do something that is otherwise unconstitutional.  483 
U.S. at 207-08.  Each of these limits either by its own terms offers no logical 
protection for State sovereignty, or has been applied by federal courts in a way that 
offers no such protection.   
In applying the “general welfare” prong, federal courts must “defer 
substantially” to the judgment of Congress, Id., and the Court has even speculated 
that the standard isn‟t judicially enforceable at all.  Id. at 207 n.2.  The requirement 
that conditions be unambiguously stated is an issue of statutory drafting and tells 
us nothing about the nature or scope of the condition, or whether the conditional 
federal grant constitutes coercion.  The requirement that the condition bear a 
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reasonable relation to the federal interest in a national project or program has the 
promise implied in Justice Sandra Day O‟Connor‟s dissent in Dole, namely that of 
drawing a distinction between conditions on how the federal grant is to be spent 
(which O‟Connor thought permissible), and conditions based on State adoption of 
a regulatory scheme not specifically related to how the grant is to be spent, (which 
O‟Connor thought impermissible).  483 U.S. at 216.  But the Court‟s holding in 
Dole forecloses that promise as a useful distinction, because the drinking-age 
requirement at issue in Dole was not a condition on how the federal highway funds 
were to be spent, but rather a loosely related regulation.  And in any case, as the 
Court implicitly recognized in Dole, the conditions attaching to federal conditional 
funds may “cross the point at which pressure turns into compulsion” even if the 
conditions are focused purely on how the funds are to be spent.  Finally, the bar 
against requiring States to do anything that is otherwise unconstitutional is 
logically of no help, because we are questioning a federal grant program 
conditioned on the States‟ adoption of policies that would otherwise be 
constitutional exercises of State regulatory autonomy.   
B. No Other Alternative Sources of Protection Have Been Effective. 
 
Some commentators have suggested that that the political process itself 
provides sufficient protection of State sovereignty from undue exertions of federal 
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power, because the several  States‟ representatives control Congress and 
hypothetically “have broadly acquiesced in sanctioning the challenged Act of 
Congress.”   Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role 
of States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 
Colombia L. Rev. 543, 559 (1954).  The point has been convincingly answered:  
“While the state-based apportionment of representation within the federal 
government may well ensure that „states interests as such‟ are protected against 
federal oppression, federal oppression is not the problem.  The problem, rather, 
lies in the ability of some states to harness the federal lawmaking power to oppress 
other states.  Not only can the state-based allocation of congressional 
representation not protect against this use of the federal lawmaking power, it 
facilitates it.”  Baker, 574 Annals at 107-08.  This is because the states that favor 
the policy objectives of the federal grant are likely already quite willing to adopt 
those policy objectives independently of the federal grant; their support for the 
federal program is therefore a vote in favor of imposing burdens on other states.  
Id.  The point carries still greater force when one considers that the U.S. Senate 
heavily dilutes the voting power of residents of large States in favor of residents of 
smaller States, creating the inherent risk that tax revenues uniformly exacted will 
be distributed preferentially to the smaller States.    
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The same calculus applies with greater force to constitutional amendments, 
the other means by which the political process can theoretically protect States from 
federal oppression.  If the States which support a federal grant program can muster 
a congressional majority, they can surely muster the numbers needed to block a 
constitutional amendment.   
III. If the ACA’s Medicaid Expansion Provisions Do Not Run Afoul of an 
Existing Doctrine of Coercion, It Must Follow that Dole Was Wrongly 
Decided and that Conditional Federal Grants Are Categorically 
Unconstitutional. 
 
The Supreme Court‟s holding in Dole was premised on the fact that States 
wanting to ignore the federal drinking-age preference stood to lose “a relatively 
small percentage of certain federal highway funds.”  483 U.S. at 211.  “When we 
consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if she adheres to her 
chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise 
obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is 
shown to be more rhetoric than fact.”  Id. This mere “temptation”  (id., quoting 
Stewart Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. at 589) in the form of “relatively mild 
encouragement” was not enough to rise to the level of coercion. Id.  Regulatory 
authority over the State‟s drinking age “remains the prerogative of the States not 
merely in theory but in fact.”  Id. at 211-12.   
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The Court cast aside evidence of the near-universal compliance with the 
federally “induced” drinking age as irrelevant.  The key issue for the Court was 
clearly the proportion of highways funds at issue, and implicitly the overall size of 
the grant.   
If from the Dole Court‟s discussion of coercion one were to devise a 
hypothetical conditional federal grant program to make sure that some such 
program would qualify as coercive, one might hypothesize an enormous federal 
grant program, far-reaching conditions, the threatened loss of all funding for non-
compliance, and, for good measure, an onerous change in the conditions of the 
already consented-to and established program, that would both increase the 
expense of the program to the States and further reduce their regulatory autonomy.  
In other words, one would hypothesize something like Medicaid and the Medicaid 
expansion provisions of the ACA.  Though an issue of material fact arguably exists 
as to whether State consent remains a prerogative of the States “in theory and in 
fact,” it is virtually impossible to imagine what conditional federal grant program 
could possibly qualify as coercive if the one in the case at bar does not.  
One conceptual problem for the Court is that, if the Medicaid expansion 
provisions of the ACA do not constitute coercion under Dole, then the judgment 
below must ultimately be vindicated: The spending power is not in fact limited by 
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any coercion doctrine, or by any other protection for State sovereignty.  But that 
would be the same as to hold that Dole itself was wrongly decided.  This is because 
the discussion of coercion in Dole was no mere dictum.  The Spending Clause 
cases of the Supreme Court have all recognized the danger of inducement rising to 
the level of compulsion, and vitally presupposed that the danger could be guarded 
against because Courts would be able to distinguish between encouragement and 
compulsion.   
The government here has not advanced the argument that the federal 
spending power is unlimited, nor can it.  Though the Commerce Clause portion of 
U.S. v. Butler is no longer valid law, Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), 
there is presumably no argument with the Butler Court‟s famous observation on 
the inherent conflict between a too-expansive reading of the Spending Clause, and 
the federal structure of the Constitution: 
Hamilton himself, the leading advocate of broad interpretation of the power 
to tax and to appropriate for the general welfare, never suggested that any 
power granted by the Constitution could be used for the destruction of local 
self-government in the states. Story countenances no such doctrine. It seems 
never to have occurred to them, or to those who have agreed with them, that 
the general welfare of the United States (which has aptly been termed " an 
indestructible Union, composed of indestructible States") might be served by 
obliterating the constituent members of the Union. But to this fatal 
conclusion the doctrine contended for would inevitably lead. And its sole 
premise is that, though the makers of the Constitution, in erecting the federal 
government, intended sedulously to limit and define its powers so as to 
reserve to the states and the people sovereign power, to be wielded by the 
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states and their citizens and not to be invaded by the United States, they 
nevertheless, by a single clause, gave power to the Congress to tear down the 
barriers, to invade the states' jurisdiction, and to become a parliament of the 
whole people, subject to no restrictions save such as are self-imposed. The 
argument, when seen in its true character and in the light of its inevitable 
results, must be rejected. 
 
297 U.S. at 77. 
 
If conditional federal grants have no limit in a doctrine of coercion, then the 
exercise of the power to make them has no limit, save such as may be self-imposed 
by the federal government.  But that is precisely the unlimited spending power 
rejected by the Framers, and by virtually every major Spending Clause case of the 
Supreme Court since.   
If there is no way to keep conditional federal grants from turning into 
compulsion, then it follows that the practice must be categorically unconstitutional.  
This is why the Court in Dole presupposed the existence of a coercion doctrine, 
and this is why Dole is probably not viable as precedent without the existence of a 
coercion doctrine.   
“When Congress encourages state regulation rather than compelling it, state 
governments remain responsive to the local electorate‟s preferences; state officials 
remain accountable to the people. […] Accountability is thus diminished when, 
due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with 
the views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation.”  
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New York v. U.S., 504 U.S. at 168-69.  In New York, the Court held that the take 
title provisions of a law for regulating the disposal of low-level radioactive waste 
crossed the line distinguishing encouragement from coercion, by giving States a 
choice between two noxious alternatives, neither of which Congress could impose 
as a free standing requirement.  Reasoned the Court, “A choice between two 
unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all.”  Id. at 176.    
It is not contested that Congress could not, as a free standing requirement, 
command the States to implement Medicaid programs.  If it is admitted that the 
penalty of opting-out of Medicaid, namely the transfer of huge sums of federal tax 
revenue from the opting-out State to other parts of the country, is a permissible 
exercise of the spending power, that does not make it a politically feasible choice 
for the States.  As a matter of fact, the sums involved can be so large as to leave 
State legislators with no realistic option for opting-out: In the case of Medicaid, the 
costs of opting-out are far too vast to be remotely politically possible.  Just raising 
the taxes necessary to cover the lost revenue – which would be to tax the citizens 
of the opting-out state twice for the same benefit – would be politically impossible. 
And so it is that even those State legislators most committed to limiting the 
expansion of the federal government, and preserving the prerogatives of the States, 
allow their ability to remain “responsive to the local electorate‟s preferences,” and 
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their ability to “remain accountable to the people” for State programs, evaporate 
along with a good measure of State regulatory autonomy – and sovereignty.  When 
the residents of a State are as a matter of fact deprived of the ultimate decision as 
to whether or not the State will comply with the conditional federal grant program, 
encouragement has crossed the line into coercion.    
To hold that there is no doctrine of coercion, or to hold that the ACA‟s 
Medicaid expansion provisions to not constitute coercion (which for all practical 
purposes would be the same thing), would be to hold that the residents of a State 
may indeed be deprived of the ultimate decision as to whether or not to comply 
with a conditional federal grant program, and that nothing in the Constitution 
protects them or the sovereignty of their State from the federal spending power.  
This would undermine an essential foundation of all the Supreme Court‟s Spending 
Clause cases, namely that in our federal system, the federal government‟s powers 
are limited, and cannot be used to destroy the sovereignty of the States.   
IV. The Proper Standard of Coercion Is Whether States Retain The 
Voluntary Prerogative In Fact To Comply or Not Comply With the 
Conditions Attached to Federal Grants. 
 
Judge Vinson was arguably correct to note that the federal courts have 
declined to articulate and develop a doctrine of coercion along the lines 
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presupposed in Dole.  But Dole contains important clues as to what the doctrine 
might consist of. 
First is the Court‟s observation that States‟ freedom to accept or reject the 
conditions remained a State prerogative “not merely in theory but in fact.”  This 
has to be read together with preceding quotation from Steward Machine Co., in 
which the Court observed, “But to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to 
coercion is to plunge the law into endless difficulties.  The outcome of such a 
doctrine is the acceptance of a philosophical determinism by which choice 
becomes in possible.”  301 U.S. at 589-90.  Temptation, then, is not the same as 
coercion; when the States can “theoretically” opt out of a federal program, doing 
so remains their prerogative “in theory.”  But the Court also noted that the States 
must be able to retain their prerogatives “in fact.”  In other words, under the given 
program, States must retain a meaningful choice “in fact.”   
Under any fair reading of Dole, what matters is the scale of the funding to be 
forfeited on non-compliance with federal conditions. The Court used terms of scale 
to describe the permissible program before it: “pressure” rather than “compulsion”; 
a “relatively small percentage” of federal funds as opposed to a large percentage; 
“temptation” rather than “coercion”; and “relatively mild encouragement” rather 
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than an overwhelming inducement to comply with federal preferences.  482 U.S. at 
211.  
The key question seems to be this: Does the federal program really allow 
States a practicable freedom of choice between compliance and non-compliance, or 
does the inducement rise to the level at which it becomes the overwhelming 
consideration, blotting out other considerations, and making any alternative 
impossible as a matter of political fact?  If, given the circumstances of any 
particular State or group of States, the financial inducement offered by Congress is 
so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion, the 
program cannot pass constitutional muster.  There is at the very least an issue of 
material fact as to whether any given federal program crosses that point.  But if any 
conditional federal grant program would run afoul of the prohibition on coercion, 
the ACA‟s Medicaid expansion provisions do.  This Court would be entirely 
justified in reaching the conclusion that there is no issue of material fact, and that 
summary judgment should have been granted for the plaintiffs below on the 
Medicaid count.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the summary judgment 
below on the Medicaid count, and hold that the ACA‟s Medicaid expansion 
provisions constitute coercion of the States in violation of the United States 
Constitution. 
 
Respectfully submitted, 
/s/ 
Mario Loyola 
Counsel for Amicus Curiae 
 
 
May 11, 2011 
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